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Strategic Similarity and Acquisition Outcomes at the Target:
Evidence from China’s Beer Industry

Yuping Zeng and Timothy S. Schoenecker

Abstract:
This study investigates the effect of horizontal acquisitions on target firms in China’s context. We
examine how competitive and organizational similarity jointly affect cost savings, revenue growth
and profitability improvement at the target in horizontal acquisitions. Using a dataset containing
information on acquired firms in China’s beer industry, we find that the way in which competitive
similarity impacts on cost savings at the target depends on organizational similarity and the type of
cost that is examined. Additionally, competitive dissimilarity is found to result in higher revenue
growth and profitability improvement at the target.
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Introduction
Horizontal acquisitions (HAs) continue to be a common strategic action taken by firms to grow and
expand (Chen and Young, 2010; UNCTAD, 2012). However, despite their popularity, HAs do not
always lead to positive outcomes – previous studies have reported a failure rate among HAs as high as
50 per cent (e.g. Papadakis and Thanos, 2010; Schoenberg, 2006). The high failure rate of HAs (and
other types of acquisitions) has triggered a significant amount of research examining the determinants
of acquisition outcomes (for reviews, see Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Haleblian et al., 2009).
The extant research, however, has predominantly focused on acquisitions conducted by firms in
developed countries, leaving acquisitions in transition economies such as China under-examined.
This study fills this research gap by examining HAs occurring in China’s context. Furthermore, prior
studies have focused primarily on outcomes at the acquirer or combined firm, whereas the effects of
the HA on the target’s post-acquisition operations remain under-investigated. This study addresses
this need by examining cost savings, revenue growth, and profitability specifically at the acquired
firm.
Similar to the experience of other countries transitioning from a centrally-planned to a
market-oriented economic system, acquisitions in China usually occur against a background of
government efforts to privatize or restructure state- or collectively- owned firms (Sheng, 1999; Xu et
al., 2010; Zeng et al., 2013). Because most firms in transition economies are not freely tradable, the
seller often plays a determinant role in the occurrence of acquisitions in these economies (Zeng et al.,
2013). In particular, since some key stakeholders (e.g. supervising government, labor unions, and in
some cases, managers) will continue to be affected by the target’s operations post-acquisition, their
selling decision (e.g. to whom to sell and under what conditions) is often driven by the target's
long-term prospects rather than receiving the highest selling price (Antal-Mokos and Toth, 2007;
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Darskuviene, 2007; Meyer, 2002; Sheng, 1999; Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998). Furthermore, the
target’s stakeholders may also impact on its post-acquisition operations. For example, due to
concerns over employment and local economic development, the local government may restrict
layoffs at the target and encourage the acquirer to make further investments into the target, using
mechanisms such as government loans and tax breaks (Sheng, 1999; Uhlenbruck and De Castro,
2000).
Given the important roles played by the target’s stakeholders and their interests in the target’s
long-term prospects in China and other transitional economies, it is meaningful to understand factors
impacting on the target’s post-acquisition performance. In particular, for managers of the acquiring
firm, such an understanding may be beneficial in two ways. First, these managers may be able to
make proposals that are attractive to suitable targets, based in part on the likelihood of a more
promising future for their business. Secondly, they may be able to better interact with key
stakeholders of the target during the integration process, which consequently can lead to better
acquisition performance.
Nevertheless, extant studies have focused primarily on the performance of the acquirer, and little
is known about how the target performs after the acquisition, in particular in the case of HAs.1 This
study overcomes this shortcoming by examining HA outcomes at the acquired firm. We focus on the
effect of strategic similarity, a factor acknowledged as the most likely predictor of HA outcomes
(Altunbas and Marques, 2008; Capron et al., 1998; Swaminathan et al., 2008).
Generally speaking, strategic similarity refers to similarities and differences in the combining
firms’ competitive activities as well as organizational features such as management style and
structure. It has been posited that strategic similarity increases the potential for cost-saving synergies
(Capron, 1999; Shelton, 1988) and facilitates the integration process (Datta, 1991; Ramaswamy,
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1997; Swaminathan et al., 2008). Meanwhile, it has also been argued that strategic differences
increase the likelihood of achieving revenue-enhancing synergies by combining the two firms’
resources (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al., 1991; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). Taking these two
lines of thought into consideration, we examine both cost savings and revenue growth, in addition to
profitability improvement, at the target. Additionally, we distinguish the two components of strategic
similarity, namely competitive similarity and organizational similarity, and examine their interaction
effect.
Typically, an acquired firm’s post-acquisition operations cannot be studied with precision,
because the financial results of the acquired firm are usually folded into the financial results of the
combined entity. However, we are able to continue to track the financial performance of acquired
firms due to a unique dataset maintained by the Chinese government that requires financial data to be
reported at the plant level.
Our results show that cost savings, revenue growth, and profitability improvement at the target
are all negatively related to competitive similarity. Additionally, we find that cost savings at the target
are greatest when both competitive and organizational dissimilarity are high. This finding may reflect
the realities that acquired firms in China are usually state-owned or former state-owned firms that
need significant restructuring and that strategic dissimilarity provides more opportunities for
effective changes to take place.
Our study contributes to our understanding of Asian business by examining how an HA target in
China may be impacted by the level of strategic similarity between the acquirer and the target firm.
Our results show that due to China’s background of economic transition, targets acquired by
competitively and organizationally different acquirers are likely to perform better than those acquired
by more similar acquirers.
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Theoretical background
Strategic similarity and HA outcomes

HAs may benefit combining firms by leading to cost-saving synergies, revenue-enhancing synergies,
or both (Barney, 2002; Capron, 1999; Capron et al., 1998; Walter and Barney, 1990). Cost savings
may be the result of economies of scale and scope in various corporate and business-level activities
or/and increased bargaining power over suppliers (Eckbo, 1983; Fee and Thomas, 2004; Teece, 1982).
Growth in revenues may occur as a result of competency-enhancing synergies that lead to a stronger
differentiated position. In turn, this may lead to increased prices or/and higher sales volume (Ahuja
and Katila, 2001; Capron, 1999; Dranove and Shanley, 1995; Harrison et al., 1991; Saxton and
Dollinger, 2004).
The potential magnitude of the combination synergies and the likelihood that they will be
captured through an effective integration process are both affected by the degree to which the acquirer
and target are strategically similar (Harrison et al., 1991; Kusewitt, 1985). While strategic similarity
has multiple dimensions, it can be thought of as having two components: competitive similarity and
organizational similarity (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Competitive similarity refers to the degree to
which the two firms’ operational and competing activities are alike. It determines the potential value
that can be created from combining two firms and the level of integration needed to realize this
potential (Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).
Organizational similarity refers to the degree to which two firms’ organizational and cultural
practices are alike and influences the effectiveness of the integration process (Chatterjee et al., 1992;
Datta, 1991; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986).
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It has been agreed that organizational similarity positively affects acquisition outcomes by
facilitating post-acquisition integration (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Empirical studies have generally
supported this assertion (Chatterjee, 1986; Datta, 1991; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). In contrast,
divergent views exist regarding the outcomes of combining competitively similar and dissimilar
firms.
On the one hand, traditional cost-efficiency theories suggest that competitive similarity
between combining firms provides more opportunities to exploit economies of scale and scope, and
therefore create more potential for cost-saving synergies (Chatterjee, 1986; Prahalad and Bettis,
1986; Ramaswamy, 1997). On the other hand, several scholars, drawing on the resource-based view
of the firm, argue that the combination of firms with different resource configurations is more likely
to result in private, unique and inimitable synergies, and therefore can lead to improved performance
at the combining firms (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al., 1991). It has also been suggested that
combining firms with different but complementary resources provides more opportunities to exploit
revenue-enhancing synergies through product innovation and market extension (Hitt et al., 1998;
Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).
These divergent perspectives indicate that the effect that competitive similarity has on the combining
firms depends on whether cost savings or revenue growth is examined. Specifically, while combining
competitively similar firms is likely to lead to more cost savings, the combination of competitive
dissimilar firms will likely result in more revenue growth. Against this theoretical background, we
examine both cost savings and revenue enhancement at the target.2
In addition to affecting acquisition outcomes independently, organizational and competitive
similarity may interact with each other as well. Stahl and Voigt (2008) examined the moderating
effect that competitive similarity has on the relationship between organizational similarity and
Page 6 of 46

acquisition outcomes. They found that organizational differences are positively related to acquisition
performance when competitive similarity is low, but negatively related to performance when
competitive similarity is high. Complementing this study, we examine whether the effect that
competitive similarity has on cost savings and revenue growth at the target depends on the level of
organizational similarity.

Acquisition outcome at the target: a seller’s vs. a buyer’s perspective
Despite the intense investigation on acquisition outcomes, few studies have examined targets
post-acquisition. Among the few that have, the majority focus on the negative impacts of the
acquisition (e.g. management departure, employee resistance) (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993;
Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Walsh and Ellwood, 1991). This
reflects the dominance of a buyer’s perspective of acquisition, where buyers are viewed as the
dominant player and sellers are portrayed as price-driven, reactive and reluctant (Graebner and
Eisenhardt, 2004).
However, evidence shows that the emphasis on the buyer’s perspective may not always be
appropriate, particularly when the target is privately- or state-owned. In their studies of acquisitions
involving private technology firms, Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) found that the seller plays an
active role in the acquisition process by selecting desirable buyers that offer long-term strategic fit
and organizational rapport. Similar phenomena were found in acquisitions in Eastern European
countries (EECs) (Antal-Mokos and Toth, 2007; Darskuviene, 2007). Zeng et al (2013) highlighted
the determinant role played by sellers in acquisitions in China due to the fact that firms are either
stated owned or not publically traded. Finally, Graebner (2004) found that leaders of the acquired
firm play critical roles in synergy realization post-acquisition.
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These empirical findings have provoked scholars to appeal for the development of a seller’s
perspective on acquisition (Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004; Zeng et al., 2013). Our focus on the target
in the context of a transitional economy (e.g. China) allows us to advance this effort and incorporate
the seller’s perspective when examining acquisition outcomes. Specifically, when a seller plays an
active role in selecting desirable buyers, the managers and other key stakeholders (e.g. local
government in China) may be well aware of the sources of potential synergies and likely integration
initiatives post-acquisition. They may also negotiate for integration initiatives that are beneficial to
the target in the long run as a condition of sale. For example, it has been shown that in acquisitions in
EECs, sellers may require buyers to make certain post-acquisition investments in the target
(Uhlenbruck and De Castro, 1998, 2000). Additionally, it is likely that stakeholders affected by the
long-term prospects of the target may work supportively with the acquirer after the acquisition to
achieve the potential synergies. The above arguments suggest that, in contrast to the negative impacts
examined in the literature, a target may emerge stronger as a result of acquisition.

Hypothesis development
Competitive similarity and cost savings at the acquired firm
According to traditional cost-efficiency theories, HAs can lead to cost savings through the
achievement of economies of scale and, to a lesser extent, economies of scope. Economies of scale
are achieved through asset divestitures and eliminating redundant activities and positions (Anand and
Singh, 1997; Capron, 1999; Tremblay and Tremblay, 1988). Economies of scope are achieved by
spreading a firm’s resources and fixed costs across a broader product line (Capron, 1999; Lubatkin et
al., 2001; Teece, 1980).
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It is likely that all HAs provide an opportunity to capture economies of scale and scope.
However, there are likely to be more opportunities for cost savings when the acquiring and target
firms are competitively similar. For example, acquiring and target firms that both place great
emphasis on marketing and advertising, or both have high degrees of capital intensity, should be more
likely to find overlapping skills and activities in their workforces or in their fixed assets. Thus,
management will have an easier time redeploying resources across competitively similar firms,
reducing operating costs and overhead expenses. Furthermore, from the seller’s perspective, the
target’s key stakeholders may be more likely to recognize potential synergies and support the
realization of those synergies when the buyer is competitively similar to the target.
Hypothesis 1: Competitive similarity will be positively related to post-acquisition
cost savings at the target.

Competitive similarity and revenue enhancement at the acquired firm
Competitively dissimilar firms target different customer groups or focus on different geographic
markets. Once the HA is complete, then both units (target and acquirer) should have access to a wider
array of products (or models), greater marketing resources/knowledge, and different distribution
networks. Similarly, each unit should be able to reach a wider array of customers. Further, as shown
in Capron (1999), combining firms focusing on different geographic markets may lead to an
enhanced innovation capability in the two units. All these factors should lead to opportunities for
growing revenue at an increased rate.
Additionally, competitively dissimilar firms (within the same industry) typically place different
degrees of emphasis on marketing, product development, etc. Barney (1988) and Harrison et al.
(1991) argue that unique and inimitable synergies are more likely to be developed between firms that
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are competitively dissimilar and have different resource bases. Furthermore, Capron et al. (2001)
suggest that resource asymmetries between the acquirer and target facilitate resource redeployment
and subsequent acquisition performance. Thus, it is more likely that a redeployment of tacit skills and
organizational knowledge will take place between the acquirer and target when they are
competitively dissimilar. In doing so, the skill and resource bases of both units should be
strengthened, likely enhancing growth prospects. Further, from a seller’s perspective, because the
synergies that can result from combining with a competitively dissimilar acquirer are primarily new
growth opportunities, various stakeholders of the target will likely benefit from these synergies and
therefore support the integration process.
Hypothesis 2: Competitive similarity will be negatively related to post-acquisition
rates of revenue growth at the target.3

Organizational similarity and the HA integration process
While competitive similarity affects the magnitude of the potential synergies that may result from an
acquisition, the degree to which these synergies are eventually realized will depend on organizational
similarity, referring to the degree to which the acquired and acquiring firms share similar managerial
approaches and corporate cultures (Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999; Stahl and Voigt, 2008).
Fully realizing synergies entails significant human interaction and coordination between
newly-combined units. Organizational dissimilarity, driven by differences in managerial and
corporate cultures, makes these interactions and coordinated activities more difficult to manage.
Particularly, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) report that a high need for integration can lead to more
active resistance by employees of both the acquired and acquiring units. Organizational dissimilarity
increases mistrust and misunderstanding between managers. Furthermore, studies taking a seller’s
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perspective have shown that the target’s managers value organizational rapport (Graebner and
Eisenhardt, 2004). Thus, we expect that organizational similarity will enhance the likelihood that
synergies will be realized, regardless of whether they involve cost reduction or revenue-enhancing
activities.
Hypothesis 3a: Greater competitive similarity will lead to a higher likelihood of cost
savings at the target when the target and acquirer are organizationally similar.
Hypothesis 3b: Greater competitive dissimilarity (i.e. less competitive similarity)
will lead to a higher likelihood of revenue growth at the target when the target and
acquirer are organizationally similar.

Competitive similarity and profitability improvement
As evidenced by our first two hypotheses, prior literature suggests that competitive similarity has
divergent effects on cost savings and revenue growth at the target; a high level of competitive
similarity may lead to more cost savings, but there will be fewer opportunities for revenue growth. In
contrast, a low level of competitive similarity may limit opportunities for achieving cost savings, but
may lead to faster revenue growth. Because both cost savings and revenue growth can lead to
profitability improvement, the relationship between competitive similarity and profitability
improvement at the target may depend on whether the combining firms primarily seek cost savings or
revenue growth. Specifically, a negative relationship between the two will likely be observed when
the acquisition is mainly driven by revenue growth, whereas a positive relationship will be likely
when the acquisition is driven by cost savings. Studies of acquisitions involving non-publically
traded and state-owned firms show that the seller’s decisions about whether to sell and to whom are
affected by the target’s future growth prospects (Antal-Mokos and Toth, 2007; Darskuviene, 2007;
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Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004). Given that our research context is China, where the majority of firms
are either state-owned or not publically traded, we expect that revenue growth is likely to be
emphasized during the negotiation and integration process (though cost savings may still be pursued
whenever possible). We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Competitive similarity will be negatively related to post-acquisition
profitability improvement at the target.

Methodology
Sample and data sources
The sample for this study consists of 139 HAs conducted by twenty acquirers in China’s beer industry
during the period 1999-2006. The beer industry has been frequently used to investigate strategic
issues (Hatten et al., 1978; Houthoofd and Heene, 1997; Johnson and Thomas, 1987), providing us
with a rich literature to identify key strategic characteristics in the industry. The number of
acquisitions conducted by each acquirer in our data ranges from one to 32 (with an average of seven).
We performed several steps to collect acquisition information. First, we reviewed an Annual
Industrial Census dataset (hereafter 'census data') provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of
China (NBSC). This dataset includes annual demographic and financial information of all
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs operating in China with annual sales revenues of
CNY5,000,000 or greater, and has been used by multiple studies (Chang and Xu, 2008; Park et al.,
2006). We first identified firms that disappeared from the database or changed their names or/and
ownership types, and then checked these firms’ websites and media reports to determine if the
changes were caused by an acquisition. Second, we reviewed the annual reports of listed companies
for information on acquisitions made. Finally, we checked the websites of large unlisted breweries to
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identify any possible acquisition activities. We obtained demographic and financial information of
the acquiring and acquired firm from the census data.

Dependent variables
Cost savings. We considered savings in three major costs of the target firm: (1) savings in the cost of
goods sold that could be achieved via economies of scale in areas such as procurement and
production; (2) savings in overhead costs that could be achieved via economies of scale in
management; (3) savings in marketing expenses (i.e. expenditures related to marketing and
distributing a firm’s products) that could be achieved via economies of scale in marketing. These
three types of costs account for 90 per cent of an average firm's sales in our sample.
We divided each of the three costs by the target’s sales to take consideration of differences in
firm size. We then calculated the savings in each type of costs by computing the differences between
two years prior to and two years after the acquisition (e.g. savings in marketing expenses = the
average of the marketing expenses-to-sales-ratio in the two years prior to the acquisition - the average
of marketing expenses-to-sales-ratio in the two years after the acquisition). The larger the variable,
the more cost savings occurred at the target. Using a four-year time window to examine acquisition
outcomes is consistent with earlier empirical studies (Bruton et al., 1994; Morosini et al., 1998; Zollo
and Singh, 2004). The year in which the acquisition occurred was excluded because it was impossible
to pinpoint the exact date on which the acquisition was actually finalized (Meeks and Meeks, 1981;
Ramaswamy, 1997).

Revenue growth. We measured revenue growth as the percentage increase in the target’s sales in the
two years after the acquisition from the two years prior to the acquisition (revenue growth = (average
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sales in the two years after the acquisition – average sales in the two years prior to the
acquisition)/average sales in the two years prior to the acquisition).

Profitability improvement. We measured profitability improvement by calculating changes in the
target’s return on assets (ROA) from the two years prior to the acquisition to the two years after the
acquisition. ROA has been observed as the least sensitive to the upward or downward estimation bias
that can be induced by changes in leverage or bargaining power resulting from an acquisition (Meeks
and Meeks, 1981).

Independent variables
Competitive similarity. Following previous studies, we operationalized competitive similarity using
similarities in key strategic characteristics of the acquirer and target pre-acquisition (Capron et al.,
2001; Harrison et al., 1991; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Ramaswamy, 1997). We identified six
strategic characteristics based on studies on strategic similarity and studies on the beer industry. The
first was marketing intensity. Multiple studies have identified differences in firms’ emphases on
marketing as an important indicator of differences in their strategies (Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1990; Ramaswamy, 1997; Swaminathan et al., 2008). Studies on the beer industry have also
identified marketing expenditure as a key strategic variable (Hatten et al., 1978; Houthoofd and
Heene, 1997; Johnson and Thomas, 1987). We measured marketing intensity as the ratio of marketing
expenses to sales.
The second was the newness of plants. Hatten et al. (1978) identified this variable as a key
strategic variable in the beer industry and found it to be positively related to breweries’ performance.
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We measured this variable using the ratio of net value to gross book value of a firm’s fixed assets. The
third strategic characteristic was the level of a firm’s current assets, such as receivables, cash, and
inventory. Houthoofd and Heene (1997) noted that a firm’s commitment to inventories, receivables
and cash is important for a differentiation strategy. We calculated this variable using the ratio of
current assets to sales.
The fourth strategic characteristic was investment intensity. Houthoofd and Heene (1997)
argued that investment intensity has a positive relationship with innovation. Similarly, Johnson and
Thomas (1987) suggested that capital and investment intensity capture the differentiating production
or technology characteristics of the beer industry. We divided a firm’s long-term investment by total
assets to obtain its investment intensity. The fifth strategic characteristic was fixed-assets intensity.
According to Houthoofd and Heene (1997), this variable may reflect a brewery’s efforts on efficiency
and search for cost advantages. We measured this variable with the ratio of a firm’s fixed assets to
total assets.
The last strategic characteristic was a firm’s geographic market coverage. Overlap in market
coverage has been repeatedly used to measure strategic similarity between combining firms (Capron,
1999; Capron et al., 2001; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006). In the beer industry, geographic coverage
has also been identified as a key strategic variable (Hatten et al., 1978; Johnson and Thomas, 1987).
In China, the industry is highly fragmented; a firm usually serves its local market and adjacent cities,
owing to high transportation costs and local government protection (Heracleous, 2001; Slocum et al.,
2006). We therefore defined a firm’s market coverage based on the location of its plants.
Following the literature (Deephouse, 1999; Fuentelsaz and Gomez, 2006; Gimeno and Woo,
1996), we measured competitive similarity using a synthesized index calculated based on the above
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strategic characteristics.
acteristics. This approach reflects the integrative nature of strategy and increases model
parsimony (Deephouse, 1999). We first calculated the Euclidean distance between the acquirer and
target on these strategic variables and then normalized the distance variable to the 0-1
0 range and
subtracted it from one to obtain a competitive similarity measure (Gimeno and Woo, 1996).
Specifically, the following formula was used:

Competitive similarity =1 -

: the

th

strategic characteristics

For the first five strategic characteristics, the difference between the two firms was calculated
using their respective values on each strategic variable in the two years prior to the acquisition. We
standardized each variablee before calculating the difference.
For difference in the acquirer and target’s geographic market coverage, we created an
ordinary variable based on their locations. In the census data, the location of a firm is coded with a
6-digit coding system (similarr to the zip code system). The first digit represents the region in which
the firm is located (the mainland of China is divided into six regions: Huabei, Dongbei, Huazhong,
Huanam, Xibei, and Xinan); the first two digits together represent the province; the
th third and fourth
the city (the third digit usually represents the city while the fourth represents a specific district in that
city); and the fifth and sixth the county. The ordinary variable was coded 1 if the acquirer and target
have exactly the same location
ocation code, 2 if only the first five digits of the two firms' location codes are
the same, 3 if only the first four digits are the same, 4 if only the first three digits are the same, 5 if
only the first 2 digits are the same, 6 if only the first digit is
is the same and the two firms are in
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neighboring provinces, 7 if the first digit is the same, but the two firms are not in neighboring
provinces, and 8 otherwise. We also standardized this variable before adding it to the above formula
for calculating competitive similarity.

Organizational similarity. Similar to competitive similarity, organizational similarity was measured
using key organizational characteristics of the combining firms prior to the acquisition. Key
organizational elements that have been identified affecting organizational fit between an acquirer and
target include organizational culture (Chatterjee et al., 1992; Lubatkin et al., 1999), management
style/administrative practices (Datta, 1991; Homburg and Bucerius, 2006; Larsson and Finkelstein,
1999), and reward and evaluation systems (Datta, 1991). These organizational elements often are
formed under the influence of the cultural and institutional environments in which a firm is embedded
(Lau et al., 2002; Ralston et al., 2008; Tsui et al., 2006). We therefore identified four organizational
variables that may capture organizational differences based on China’s context.
The first was ownership. In China, firms exist with different ownership structures that
underlie differences in organizational culture as well as management systems and styles (Child, 2000;
Tsui et al., 2006). In general, firms can be divided into three major categories based on their
ownership, namely domestically-owned firms, firms with foreign funds, and firms with funds from
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. Within each category, there are sub-categories of ownership type
(for example, domestic firms can be divided into state-owned, collectively-owned, etc.). The
Appendix provides a list of all ownership types and their corresponding code used by the NBSC in the
annual industrial census. Multiple studies have shown that organizational culture and management
styles vary across the major ownership types as well as across sub-categories within each major
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ownership type (Deshpande and Farley, 2000; Ding et al., 1997; Lau et al., 2002; Tsui et al., 2006;
Wang et al., 2007).
The second organizational variable was firm age. Tsui et al. (2006) found that organizational
cultural values are affected by firm age, measured as the number of years since a firm was founded.
The third organizational variable was the economic development of the province where a firm is
located. A contextual reality in China is that there are significant regional differences in economic
development. Lau et al. (2002) found that this regional difference results in differences in employees’
predisposition toward change and development culture. Provincial economic development was
measured using per capita gross domestic product (GDP).
The fourth organizational variable was employee compensation, which may reflect a firm’s
reward and evaluation systems. Employee compensation was measured using the total wages and
benefits of a firm divided by the number of employees of the firm. Information on provincial per
capita GDP was obtained from various years’ Statistics Year Book of China; information for other
organizational variables was obtained from the census data.
Similar to measuring competitive similarity, we measured organizational similarity using a
synthesized index calculated based on the above organizational characteristics. We first calculated
the Euclidean distance between acquirer and target on the four organizational strategic variables; we
then normalized the distance variable to the 0-1 range and subtracted it from one to obtain an
organizational similarity measure.
For ownership difference, we created an ordinary variable based on the 3-digit code of
ownership types listed in the Appendix. The variable equaled 1 if the two firms have exactly the same
ownership code, 2 if only the first two digits of the ownership code are the same, 3 if only the first
digit is the same, 4 if one of the two firms is a domestically-owned firm and the other is a firm with
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funds from Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan, and 5 otherwise. We standardized this variable before
adding it to the calculation of organizational similarity. For differences in firm age, provincial per
capita GDP, and employee compensation, we standardized these variables and then calculated the
differences between the two firms in the two years prior to the acquisition.

Control variables
For all models, we controlled for the target’s prior-acquisition profitability and the relative size of the
acquired firm with respect to the acquirer. It has been suggested that relative size is positively related
to synergy potential (Seth, 1990) and realized synergies (Capron, 1999). Additionally, larger and
better-performing targets may enjoy a higher relative standing in the combined company and a lower
management departure after the acquisition, reducing detrimental disruptions caused by the
acquisition (Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Hambrick and Cannella, 1993; Very et al., 1997). We
measured a target’s pre-acquisition profitability using its industry-adjusted ROA in the two years
prior to the acquisition. Relative size was measured as the ratio of the target’s sales to the acquirer’s
sales two years prior to the acquisition.
We also controlled for each acquirer’s pre-acquisition profitability, acquisition experience,
and nationality (i.e. foreign versus domestic). Managers of more profitable acquirers may be more
confident in their abilities and thus more likely to dominate during the integration process (Hambrick
and Cannella, 1993). Acquirers’ pre-acquisition profitability was measured using its
industry-adjusted ROA in the two years prior to the acquisition. Acquirers with greater acquisition
experience may be more capable of conducting acquisitions and thus perform better (Hambrick and
Cannella, 1993; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Acquisition experience in an acquirer was measured by the
number of HAs it had made in the beer industry prior to the focal acquisition. Zeng and Wu (2007)
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showed that compared to domestic acquirers, foreign acquirers are more likely to select strategically
similar targets. Therefore, we controlled for the acquirer’s nationality using a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the acquirer is not originally from China and 0 otherwise.
Finally, we controlled for the year in which an acquisition occurred to take consideration of
possible macro-level changes that may affect the dependent variables.

Analysis and results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for all variables. In order to reduce
the risk of multicollinearity, we mean-censored the independent and control variables (Aiken and
West, 1991). The highest variance inflation factor in the models was 1.1, indicating a low threat of
multicollinearity. Because we have multiple dependent variables that very likely have related errors
(i.e. integration activities may simultaneously affect costs savings, sales growth and profitability at
the target), we applied seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), a statistical technique that solves a set
of regression equations simultaneously and allows for error covariance among the equations (Zellner,
1962). Since there are five dependent variables in our study (savings in cost of goods sold, savings in
overhead costs, savings in marketing expenses, revenue growth, and profitability improvement), five
regressions were run simultaneously at each time. For each dependent variable, the control variables
were included in Model 1, competitive and organizational similarity were entered in Model 2, and the
interaction term between competitive and organizational similarity in Model 3 (there is no interaction
term in the model where target profitability improvement is the dependent variable).
Table 2 tests the relationships between competitive similarity and the three types of cost
savings. The dependent variable is savings in cost of goods sold in Panel 1, savings in overhead
expenses in Panel 2, and savings in marketing expenses in Panel 3. As shown in Model 2 in Panels 1-3,
competitive similarity has a negative effect on cost savings at the target. These results are inconsistent
Page 20 of 46

with Hypothesis 1’s prediction of a positive relationship between competitive similarity and cost
savings. We will provide possible explanations for these results in the discussion section.
Model 3 of the three panels in Table 2 tests Hypothesis 3a, which predicts that greater
competitive similarity will lead to a higher likelihood of cost savings at the target when the target and
acquirer are organizationally similar. The interaction term between competitive and organizational
similarity has a significant and positive coefficient in all three panels. Because the main effect of
competitive similarity is the opposite of our prediction, it is difficult to interpret this interaction effect
by simply looking at the sign of the coefficient of the interaction term. Following Aiken and West’s
(1991) suggestion, we plotted the relationship between competitive similarity and the target’s cost
savings when organizational similarity is at a high (one standard deviation above the mean) and a low
level (one standard deviation below the mean) in Figures 1-3, in order to gain a better understanding
of the interaction effect.
As shown in Figure 1, savings in cost of goods sold increase with the increase of competitive
similarity when organizational similarity is high, but an opposite relationship applies when
organizational similarity is low. Figure 2 shows a similar pattern – a positive relationship between
overhead expenses and competitive similarity when organizational similarity is high and a negative
relationship when organizational similarity is low. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 3a –
organizational similarity facilitates the realization of cost savings resulting from competitive
similarity. The patterns in Figure 3, however, do not confirm Hypothesis 3a – there is a negative
relationship between savings in marketing expenses and competitive similarity regardless of the level
of organizational similarity.
Table 3 reports results for the effect that competitive similarity has on the target’s revenue
growth. Consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2, there is a significantly negative relationship
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between competitive similarity and the target’s sales growth. Model 3 tests Hypothesis 3b, which
predicts that competitive dissimilarity will lead to a higher likelihood of revenue growth at the target
when the acquirer and target are organizationally similar. Inconsistent with this prediction, the
interaction between competitive and organizational similarity is insignificant.
Table 4 tests the effect of strategic similarity on profitability improvement at the target.
Consistent with the prediction of H4, competitive similarity has a significant, negative relationship
with the improvement of the target firm’s post-acquisition ROA.

Discussion and conclusions
This study was intended to enhance our understanding of the impacts that HAs have on target firms in
China’s context. Drawing on cost-efficiency theories, the resource-based view of the firm, and a
seller’s perspective on acquisition, we examined how cost savings, revenue growth and profitability
at the target are simultaneously affected by the two components of strategic similarity, namely
competitive and organizational similarity. We tested our hypotheses using a unique dataset
containing information about acquired firms in HAs in China’s beer industry.
Our results (see Figures 1-3) show that although competitively similar targets and acquirers are
able to realize minor savings in cost of goods sold and overhead expenses when they are also
organizationally similar, much greater cost savings occur when both competitive and organizational
dissimilarity are high. What appears to occur is that steep reductions are made in the target’s spending
(cost of goods sold, overhead, marketing) when target and acquirer compete differently and have
different managerial practices and cultures.
One possible explanation of these findings is that many acquired firms in a transitional economy
like China are state-owned or formerly-state-owned firms that lack the ability and knowledge to
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effectively compete as a market entity (Zeng et al., 2013). Significant restructuring of these firms
after acquisition is often necessary to transfer them into competitive market entities (Meyer and
Estrin, 2001; Meyer & Lieb-Doczy, 2003). Being acquired by a firm that is both competitively and
organizationally dissimilar may imply more opportunities for operational restructuring as well as
management reform, which in turn leads to production and management efficiency at the target. This
explanation is consistent with the negative relationship between the target’s pre-acquisition
profitability and cost savings in Table 2, which indicates that cost savings are more likely to occur in
targets that performed poorly prior to acquisition.
We also found that combining competitively dissimilar firms led to more opportunities for
revenue growth at the target. This result supports the stream of literature emphasizing the beneficial
effects of strategic differences (Barney, 1988; Harrison et al., 1991; Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999).
Furthermore, our results show that the realization of this revenue-enhancing synergy does not depend
on organizational similarity between acquirer and target. This finding is consistent with the notion
that the realization of revenue-based synergies involves less structural change, a low level of resource
and activity consolidation, and a high level of autonomy at the target (Ambrosini et al., 2011; Stahl
and Voigt, 2008; Zaheer et al., 2013). All these integration characteristics reduce the likelihood of
problems that might arise from organizational differences.
Finally, consistent with our expectation, targets acquired by competitively dissimilar acquirers
are found to experience greater post-acquisition profitability improvement. This result may reflect the
contextual feature that the target's growth prospects are a key determinant of the seller’s decisions
concerning the acquisition (e.g. whether to sell and to whom) in emerging markets (Antal-Mokos and
Toth, 2007; Darskuviene, 2007). This contextual feature may lead to an emphasis on achieving
revenue growth through combining with competitively dissimilar firms.
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Our study contributes to the literature on Asian business as well as research on acquisitions. First,
although acquisitions in China have been growing significantly since the 1990s, academic
investigation of these acquisitions is scarce. The few studies examining acquisitions in China focus
on either firms’ acquiring/selling strategies (Xu et al, 2010; Zeng et al., 2013; Zou, 2008) or the stock
market’s reactions to acquisition announcements (Gaur et al., 2013). As a result, little is known about
acquisition outcomes, and in particular outcomes at the target. Our study therefore enhances the
literature by comprehensively examining how a target firm may be affected by strategic similarity, a
factor that has been identified as the most likely predictor of HA outcomes.
Second, our focus on the target’s post-acquisition operations advances the acquisition literature.
Although the acquired firm usually becomes a part of the acquiring firm after the acquisition, many of
its stakeholders continue interacting with it. Understanding acquisition outcomes from the target's
perspective will not only help the acquirer to better intact with these stakeholders, but could also help
the target’s stakeholders to make better-informed decisions. Particularly in a context like China,
where the seller can play an active role in the acquiring and integration process, an understanding of
how the target will be impacted by the acquisition may not only facilitate the occurrence of an
acquisition, but could also reduce the acquisition price and integration costs (Graebner, 2004;
Graebner and Eisenhardt, 2004).
Third, our study also contributes to the acquisition literature by examining cost savings and
revenue growth at the target simultaneously. This approach allows us to integrate efficiency theories
and the resource-based view of the firm and helps address the inconsistent views on whether
combining strategically dissimilar or similar firms is more beneficial (Barney, 1988; Chatterjee,
1986; Harrison, et al., 1991; Ramaswamy, 1997). Finally, our study enhances our understanding of
the interaction between competitive and organizational similarity, an area that remains
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under-explored (Stahl and Voigt, 2008). Our findings of the significant interaction effect between
competitive and organizational similarity on cost savings and the insignificant effect between the two
on revenue growth indicate that a contingency model is necessary when examining the relationship
between strategic similarity and acquisition outcomes.
Our study has important implications for managers. Our findings show that strategic
dissimilarity is beneficial to the target in China’s context, not only by leading to revenue-enhancing
synergies, but also by resulting in more cost savings. Additionally, in contrast to the
well-acknowledged importance of organizational similarity in post-acquisition integration, it seems
that in a transition economy like China, organizational dissimilarity facilitates the restructuring of the
target, which in turn leads to cost savings. Therefore, managers should pay special attention to the
potential benefits of strategic differences when evaluating acquisition targets and factors affecting
acquisition outcomes.
Our study is not free of limitations. First, although our measures of competitive and
organizational similarity were based on key strategic and organizational variables identified in the
literature, they may not be able to thoroughly capture these concepts given the secondary nature of
our data. Future studies may use survey or interview methods to obtain a more direct measure of these
concepts. Second, data availability required that we examine changes in the performance of the target
firm for two years following the year of its acquisition. It may be that some changes, particularly
those associated with cost reductions, may take longer than two years to be fully realized. Thus, our
two-year window may provide only a partially-complete picture of this event. Third, we focused on
HAs only in China’s beer industry. Although this approach allowed us to avoid complexities that
could be caused by differences in industries if HAs in multiple industries were used, the
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generalizability of our results needs to be confirmed by future studies using data from different
industries.

Notes
1. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) investigated the post-acquisition performance of targets, but
did not focus exclusively on horizontal acquisitions.
2. The beneficial outcomes of HA (cost savings, revenue growth, etc.) can occur at either the
acquiring or acquired firm (or both). However, our study purposely focuses on effects of the HA at
the acquired firm. This focus is not meant to imply that most or all HA effects occur at the target firm.
3. We have used the term competitive similarity, as opposed to competitive dissimilarity, in H2 to
keep the wording consistent across hypotheses. Alternatively, we could have stated this hypothesis
such that competitive dissimilarity will be positively related to post-acquisition revenue growth at the
target.
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Figure 1: The relationship between competitive similarity and savings in cost of goods sold at high and low levels of organizational similarity
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Figure 2: The relationship between competitive similarity and savings in overhead expenses at high and low levels of organizational similarity
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Figure 3: The relationship between competitive similarity and savings in marketing expenses at high and low levels of organizational
similarity
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix.
1
1 Savings in
cost of goods
sold
2 Savings in
overhead
expenses
3 Savings in
marketing
expenses
4 Revenue
growth
5
Profitability
improvement
6
Competitive
similarity
7
organizationa
l similarity
8 target
relative size
9 target
pre-acquisitio
n ROA
10. acquirer
pre-acquisitio

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

0.222*

0.019

0.42*

0.153*

0.452*

0.084

0.442*

0.475*

0.384*

0.131

-0.182*

-0.097

-0.147

-0.121

-0.148

0.03

-0.232*

-0.159

-0.155

-0.013

0.019

0.039

-0.024

-0.039

-0.003

0.014

0.112

0.126

-0.153*

-0.283*

-0.337*

-0.06

-0.408*

-0.017

0.158*

0.028

0.06

-0.033

-0.065

-0.014

-0.007

-0.307*

-0.127

0.014
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0.009

10

11

12

n ROA
11 Acquirer's
Acquisition
experience
12 Foreign
acquirer
Mean
S.D.

-0.095

0.172

0.079

0.133

-0.026

0.244

-0.271

-0.148

-0.05

-0.192*

-0.119

-0.047

-0.026

-0.109

-0.018

0.207

0.459

0.145

0.11

-0.292*

0.154*

0.024
0.119

0.016
0.1

-0.011
0.132

0.985
3.897

0.001
0.123

0.802
0.092

0.786
0.119

1.764
16.141

-0.007
0.107

0.023
0.054

1.468
1.5

* p<0.05; n=139.
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0.369
0.484

Table 2: Strategic similarity and cost savings at the target.
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Panel 1 DV: Target cost
savings – cost of goods
sold
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Panel 2 DV: Target cost savings –
overhead expenses
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Panel 3 DV: Target cost savings –
marketing expenses
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Competitive
similarity

-0.226
(0.119)*

-0.277
(0.117)**

-0.118
(0.063)*

-0.147
(0.061)**

-0.356
(0.095)***

-0.400
(0.093)***

Organizational
similarity

0.073
(0.106)

0.040
(0.103)

-0.040
(0.056)

-0.059
(0.054)

-0.105
(0.084)

-0.135
(0.082)

Competitive
similarity *
organizational
similarity
Relative size

2.468
(0.827)***

1.402
(0.419)***

2.159
(0.685)***

-0.004
(0.026)

-0.001
(0.026)

0.001
(0.025)

0.022
(0.013)

0.018
(0.014)

0.020
(0.013)

0.037
(0.021)*

0.029
(0.021)

0.031
(0.020)

Target’s
pre-acquisition
profitability
Acquirer’s
pre-acquisition
profitability
Acquirer’s
acquisition
experience
Foreign acquirer

-0.173
(0.099)*

-0.144
(0.100)

-0.135
(0.097)

-0.212
(0.052)***

-0.189
(0.053)***

-0.184
(0.051)***

-0.442
(0.082)***

-0.374
(0.080)***

-0.366
(0.077)***

0.075
(0.219)

0.030
(0.220)

0.108
(0.215)

0.109
(0.115)

0.065
(0.116)

0.109
(0.112)

0.001
(0.181)

-0.126
(0.175)

-0.058
(0.171)

-0.012
(0.009)

-0.009
(0.010)

-0.010
(0.010)

0.015
(0.005)***

0.013
(0.005)**

0.013
(0.005)**

-0.008
(0.008)

-0.012
(0.008)

-0.012
(0.008)

-0.022
(0.023)

-0.033
(0.025)

-0.032
(0.024)

0.008
(0.012)

0.010
(0.013)

0.011
(0.013)

-0.000
(0.019)

0.004
(0.020)

0.006
(0.019)

Constant

0.035
(0.054)

0.041
(0.056)

0.031
(0.054)

0.049
(0.028)*

0.039
(0.029)

0.033
(0.028)

0.043
(0.045)

0.015
(0.045)

0.006
(0.043)

Observations
R-squared

139
0.096

139
139
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0.121
0.174

139
0.197

139
0.219

139
0.274

139
0.204

139
0.283

139
0.332

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0; standard errors in parentheses; year dummies included but not shown.
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Table 3: Strategic similarity and revenue growth at the target.
Model 1
Competitive
similarity

Model 2
-5.923
(2.460)**

Model 3
-6.471
(2.473)***

Organizational
similarity

-1.724
(2.177)

-2.082
(2.176)

Competitive
similarity *
organizational
similarity
Relative size

26.326
(18.889)

-0.316
(0.533)

-0.462
(0.536)

-0.437
(0.532)

Pre-acquisition
target profitability

-1.313
(2.062)

-0.192
(2.066)

-0.091
(2.051)

Acquirer’s
pre-acquisition
profitability
Acquirer’s
acquisition
experience
Foreign acquirer

-2.519
(4.547)

-4.630
(4.534)

-3.806
(4.539)

0.074
(0.195)

0.004
(0.209)

-0.001
(0.208)

-0.474
(0.483)

-0.407
(0.520)

-0.388
(0.516)

Constant

-0.234
(1.117)
139
0.104

-0.701
(1.155)
139
0.143

-0.810
(1.149)
139
0.156

Observations
R-squared
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*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; year
dummies included but not shown.

Table 4: Strategic similarity and profitability improvement at the
target.
Model 1
Competitive
similarity

Model 2
-0.229
(0.130)*

Organizational
similarity

0.014
(0.115)

Relative size
Pre-acquisition
target
profitability
Acquirer’s
pre-acquisition
profitability
Acquirer’s
acquisition
experience
Foreign acquirer
Constant
Observations
R-squared

-0.020
(0.028)

-0.021
(0.028)

-0.441
(0.108)***

-0.405
(0.109)***

0.026
(0.238)

-0.035
(0.240)

-0.005
(0.010)

-0.005
(0.011)

0.019
(0.025)

0.013
(0.028)

-0.043
(0.058)
139
0.161

-0.048
(0.061)
139
0.180

*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1; standard errors in parentheses; year
dummies included but not shown.
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Appendix: Ownership types and codes of firms in China.
Code

Ownership of Registration
Domestic enterprises

110

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) (Guoyou qiye)

120

Collectively-owned enterprises (COEs) (Qiti qiye)

130

Joint-stock cooperative enterprises (Gufen hezuo qiye)

140

Domestic joint ventures (Lianying qiye)

141

Joint ventures between SOEs(Guoyou lianying qiye)

142

Joint ventures between COEs (Jiti lianying qiye)

143

Joint ventures between SOEs and COEs (Guoyou and jiti lianying qiye)

149

Other domestic joint ventures (Qita lianying qiye)

150

Limited-liability enterprises (LLEs) (Youxian ziren gongsi)

151

State-owned LLEs (Guoyou duzi gongsi)

159

Other LLEs

160

Share-holding enterprises (SHEs) (Guofen youxian gongsi)

170

Privately-owned enterprises (POEs) (Siyou qiye)

171

Wholly privately-owned enterprises (Siyou duzi qiye)

172

Private cooperative enterprises(Siying hehuo qiye)

173

Privately-owned LLEs (Siying youxian zeren gongsi)

174

Privately-owned SHEs (Siying youxian zeren gongsi)

190

Other types of enterprises
Enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan
(HMTEs)

210

HMTEs in joint-venture format (Gang, Ao, Tai hezi jingying qiye)

220

HMTEs in cooperative format (Gang, Ao, Tai hezuo jingying qiye)

230

Wholly-owned HMTEs (Gang, Ao, Tai duzi jingying qiye)

240

Shareholding HMTEs (Gang, Ao, Tai touzi gufen youxian gongsi)
Foreign invested enterprises (FIEs)

310

Sino-foreign joint ventures (Zhongwai hezi jingying qiye)

320

Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises (Zhongwai hezuo jingying qiye)

330

Wholly-owned FIEs (Waizi qiye)

340

Foreign-invested SHEs (Waishang touzi youxian gongsi)

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China
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